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* The United States Supreme Court decided Bob Jones University v. United States

and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States on May 24, 1983. See 51
U.S.L.W. 4593 (U.S. May 24, 1983) Nos. 81-3 and 81-1. Although this Note was
completed before the Court released its decision, much of the author's analysis serves
both as a critique of the Court's opinion and as a guide for further legislative

action.-Ed.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert H. Jackson'
The question of whether tax-exempt religious schools with
racially based policies should be allowed to retain their exemp-2
tions has evoked a flood of commentary from religious groups,
civil rights groups,' academics, 4 and legislators.' Even the Presi1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2. Amicus briefs have been submitted in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d
147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)(argued Oct. 12, 1982), by the
General Conference Mennonite Church; the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints;
the National Association of Evangelicals; the Church of God in Christ, Mennonite; the
Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society; the National
Committee for Amish Religious Freedom; the United Church of Christ; the National
Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith. (available Nov. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
3. Amicus briefs have been submitted in Bob Jones by the Lawyers Committee for
Civil Rights; the American Civil Liberties Union; the American Jewish Committee; the
National Association for Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational
Fund; the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers; and the International Human
Rights Law Group. (available Nov. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
4. See, e.g., Anderson, Tax-Exempt Private Schools Which Discriminate on The
Basis of Race: A Proposed Revenue Procedure, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 356 (1980); Drake,
Tax Status of Private Segregated Schools: The New Revenue Procedure, 20 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 463 (1979); Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under
Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 229 (1979); Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially DiscriminatoryReligious
Schools, 36 TAx. L. REv. 477 (1981); Note, First Amendment-Free Exercise
Clause-Conflict With 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 381 (1982); Note, The IRS,
Discrimination,and Religious Schools: Does the Revised ProposedRevenue Procedure
Exact Too High a Price?,56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 141 (1980); Note, The InternalRevenue
Service's Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt
Organizations,54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1979); Comment, Revocation of Tax-Exempt
Status of Religious Schools-Conflict With the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 949; Comment, The
Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian EducationalInstitutions That Discriminate on the
Basis of Race, 65 IOWA L. REv. 258 (1979); Casenotes, ConstitutionalLaw-FederalIncome Taxation-IRS Lacks Authority to Revoke Tax Exempt Status and Deny Availability of CharitableDeductions to Private School PracticingRacial Discriminationon
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dent has made his position known 6 The question has been
presented to the United States Supreme Court in the companion
cases Bob Jones University v. United States7 and Goldsboro
Christian Schools v. United States."
This Note analyzes the relationship between the federal
public policies advanced in support of denying the schools' exemptions and the constitutional provisions supporting continued
exemption. The analysis suggests that the federal policies have
been given a broader scope than is mandated by the Constitution. In contrast, religiously motivated policies of the schools are
protected by the first amendment against indirect burdens
placed upon them by selective revocation of tax exemptions. In
light of this analysis, this Note suggests possible congressional
responses to the schools' tax-exempt status.

II.
A.

FACTS AND REASONING OF THE COURTS

Bob Jones University v. United States

Bob Jones University is a conservative Christian school located in Greenville, South Carolina. The school is private and
receives no federal, state, or local funding. Although the school
offers a variety of educational programs, its central purpose is to

develop the Christian character of its students.' Every aspect of
the school's program is related to the Christian religion. Classes,
services, and meals all begin with prayer. All teachers attempt to
relate their instruction to the Bible. Rules governing student
Religious Grounds, 57 U. DE'r. J. URB. L. 415 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status
of Racially DiscriminatoryPrivateSchools: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings on S. 103, S. 449, S. 990, S. 995, Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Mgmt. Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); TaxExempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings on Proposed IRS Revenue ProcedureAffecting Tax Exemption of Private Schools Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
6. Statement by the President on Tax Exemptions for Private, Nonprofit Educational Institutions, 18 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 20 (Jan. 12, 1982).
7. 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)(argued Oct. 12,
1982).
8. No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981) cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)(argued
Oct. 12, 1982).
9. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978).
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conduct are based on Biblical principles. The school's religious
character led the District Court to find that "Bob Jones University ...

composes its own religious order.""0

Faculty and students at the University profess faith in Jesus
Christ and adherence to Biblical beliefs.1" The school has a religiously motivated belief against interracial marriage. The sincerity of this belief has not been disputed. The belief is evidenced
12
by a student rule against interracial dating and marriage.
Prior to 1970, Bob Jones University was accorded tax-exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under 26
U.S.C. section 501(c)(3).1" In 1970, following the decision of
Green v. Kennedy,1 4 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 71-447,15
which stated that the IRS would no longer accord tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory schools. The University sought,
but failed to obtain, injunctive relief against the administrative
actions of the IRS,16 and its tax exemption officially was revoked
in 1976, retroactive to 1970. The University paid twenty-one dol10. Id. at 895.
11. Each faculty member and student must sign a statement affirming the religious
doctrines stated in the University's Creed:
[I believe in] the inspiration of the Bible (both Old and New Testaments);
the creation of man by the direct act of God; the incarnation and virgin birth
of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ; His identification as the Son of God; His
vicarious atonement for the sins of mankind by the shedding of His blood on
the Cross; the resurrection of His body from the tomb; His power to save men
from sin; the new birth through the regeneration by the Holy Spirit; and the
gift of eternal life by the grace of God.
The Creed is incorporated in the University's Certificate of Incorporation. See 468
F. Supp. at 893.
12. That rule provides:
There is to be no interracialdating
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization which holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will
be expelled.
. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote; or encourage others to violate the
University's dating rules and regulations will be expelled.
468 F. Supp. at 895 (emphasis in original).
A brief explanation of the religious basis for the policy is contained in BOB JONES
UNIvERsrrY, RELIGIous FREEDOM IMPERILED: THE IRS AND BJU, 41 (1982).

13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(WEST SUPP. 1982). See infra note 57 for the text of this
section.
14. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
15. 1971-2 C.B. 230.
16. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
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lars of the tax due and sued to have the amount refunded. The
IRS counterclaimed for the' entire amount of tax due from 1970
through 1975. The District Court for the District of South Carolina found for the University. 17 On appeal, a threejudge panel of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."8 The University
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which
the Court granted on October 13, 1981.19
In determining that the University was entitled to tax-exempt status, the district court addressed three issues. First, it
considered whether the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3)
applied to religious organizations. The IRS interpretation embodied in Revenue Ruling 71-447 disallowed exemptions for racially discriminatory educational organizations. The court reasoned that regardless of the availability of an educational
exemption, the University, because it was primarily religious,
would qualify for a religious exemption. 20
Second, the court considered whether revocation of the University's tax exemption would offend the first amendment. The
court regarded the policy against interracial dating as an expression of religious belief.2" Requiring the University to forgo its
religious principles in order to obtain exemption would burden
its free exercise of religion. 22 Although the burden might be justified by a compelling state interest, the court found no "compelling public policy against this variety of discrimination in the
private sector.

' 23

The court also indicated that the IRS interpre-

tation of section 501(c)(3) would violate the establishment
clause. Conditioning the tax exemption on a religious organization's adherence to public policy would destroy the neutrality
underlying tax exemptions for religious organizations.24 Furthermore, continual government monitoring of religious organizations would lead to the type of entanglement between government and religion avoided by neutral exemptions. 25

17. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Bob Jones Univ.
Bob Jones Univ.
Bob Jones Univ.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 899.
See Walz v. Tax
Bob Jones Univ.

v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 895-96.

Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 901.
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Finally, the court considered whether the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) exceeded the scope of the Service's congressionally delegated authority. The IRS presented two theories
that would require imposing a public policy "gloss" on the section. The first was that Congress could not have intended to provide exemptions for activities that were illegal or against declared public policy. 26 The court agreed that this interpretation

could be derived from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner,27 but
noted that the Tank Truck holding was limited and was further
qualified by Commissioner v. Tetlier.25 The resulting principle is

that tax laws should not be used "as a means of enforcing other
laws and public policies if the revenue statute makes no mention
of such conduct or if there does not exist a tight nexus between
the tax benefit and the alleged unlawful conduct.

' 29

Since sec-

0

tion 501(c)(3) did not mention discrimination and the availability of tax exemption would not encourage the University to
discriminate, the public policy gloss was inapposite.3 '
The second theory advanced by the IRS was that each of
the types of organizations listed in section 501(c)(3) must meet
common law charitable standards to qualify for exemption.
Common law charitable trusts must not violate public policy.
Hence, if the charitable requirement applies, organizations violating any public policy could not qualify for exemption under
section 501(c)(3). The court found nothing in the language of the
32
statute supporting this view.
In reversing the district court's decision, a majority of the
three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals fo26. Id. at 902.
27. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Tank Truck Rentals deducted the amount of fines paid when
its trucks were ticketed for violating state maximum weight laws. The Court held that
these fines could not be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
I.R.C. § 23(a)(1)(A)(1939).
28. 383 U.S. 687 (1966). Tellier deducted the amount of attorney fees incurred in
defending himself against criminal charges arising from the business of underwriting and
selling securities. The Court held that these expenses were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under I.R.C. § 162(a)(1954). The Court explained that Tank
Truck was within a "sharply limited and carefully defined" exception to the general
principal that the federal income tax is "not a sanction against wrongdoing." Id. at 694.
29. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 905.
30. Compare LR.C. § 501(i)(West Supp. 1982).
31. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 903.
32. Id. at 905-07.
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cused on two issues. The first was whether statutory authority
existed for the nondiscrimifiation condition imposed by the IRS
on section 501(c)(3) educational exemptions. The court accepted
both IRS theories for applying a public policy gloss on section
501(c)(3) that the district court had rejected. 3 As an educational
institution, the University was required to comply with the nondiscrimination policy in order to qualify for tax exemption. Although noting that the University's interracial dating policy applied "equally to both black and white students, 34 the court
concluded, on the basis of equal protection cases such as Loving
v. Virginia,35 that the policy was discriminatory. 6 The court rejected the district court's argument that there was an insufficient relationship between the violation of public policy and tax
benefits for this case to come within the Tank Truck principle,
basing that rejection partly on the conclusion that "the nondiscrimination policy assures that Americans will not be providing
indirect support for any educational organization that discrimi37
''
nates on the basis of race.

The court next considered whether revoking the University's tax exemption for failure to comply with the nondiscriminatory policy violated the first amendment. 8 The court acknowledged that revoking the school's tax exemption might
burden its free exercise of religion, but concluded that the burden was justified by balancing the competing interests involved.
The state has a compelling interest in assuring nondiscriminatory education. In contrast, the religious belief against interracial dating need not be abandoned to comply with IRS requirements. The school could still teach its belief and no student
would be required to violate his personal religious beliefs.39 In
addressing the argument that revoking the University's tax exemption would violate the establishment clause, the court applied the standard three-part entanglement test developed in recent Supreme Court opinions. 40 It concluded first that the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 151.
Id. at 152.
388 U.S. 1 (1967). See infra note 132.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 152.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154-55.
E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra note 83.
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nondiscrimination policy served a secular purpose. Second, the
court concluded that the effect of the IRS policy would not advance some religions over others and that the neutrality principle underlying exemptions to religious organizations would not
be violated if some religious practices were required to yield to
compelling governmental interests. Finally, the court concluded
that determining whether schools maintained racially neutral
policies was less entangling than determining whether a discriminatory policy was based upon sincerely held religious beliefs.4 '
B.

Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States

Goldsboro Christian Schools is a private educational organization located in Goldsboro, North Carolina and receives no federal, state, or local funds. The state-accredited school enrolls
students from kindergarten through grade twelve.42 The central
purpose of the school as set forth in its articles of incorporation
is identical to that of Bob Jones University.4 3 Classes begin with

prayer and students are required to enroll in one Bible course
each semester.
The school is closely related to the Second Baptist Church
of Goldsboro, although they are incorporated separately." The
Church's pastor was instrumental in establishing the school. The
Church provides physical facilities and the services of some
Church staff to the school without charge.45
While the school does not require that its students attend
the Second Baptist Church of Goldsboro or subscribe to any
particular religious belief,46 it does have rules for student conduct based upon its religious beliefs. The school also has a Biblically based belief against interracial marriage, which is the basis
for the school's admission policy. Although the school has admit41. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 154-55.

42. Brief for the United States at 8, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States, No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)(No. 81-1
argued Oct. 12, 1982)[hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief].
43. Compare Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. at
1316 (quoting the school's statement of purpose in its articles of incorporation) with Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 893 (quoting the school's statement of
purpose in its articles of incorporation).
44. Goldsboro, 436 F. Supp. at 1316.
45. Id.
46. U.S. Brief, supra note 42, at 9.
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ted non-Caucasion students, it does not admit black students.
The district court assumed
that this policy was "based upon a
'4 7
valid religious belief.

Goldsboro had never requested a determination of its taxexempt status from the IRS. After an audit of the school's
books, the IRS determined that the school was not exempt and
assessed the amount of unpaid tax. The school paid part of the
tax and then sued the IRS to recover it.48
In determining whether the school was entitled to tax-exempt status, the district court addressed three issues. First, it
considered whether section 501(c)(3) imposed a requirement
that exempt organizations comply with public policy. The court
found that a public policy limitation was applicable for two reasons. The legislative history of the section indicated that the exemptions were granted in exchange for services provided to the
public, and "since the benefit to the public was the justification
for the tax benefits, it would be improper to allow tax benefits to
organizations
whose practices violate clearly declared public pol'49
icy."

Alternatively, the court cited Tank Truck Rentals v.

0 for the proposition that a tax exemption statute
Commissioner"
must be construed based on the presumption that. Congress
would not have intended to exempt "organizations which actively violate public policy."5 1 The court next considered
whether racially discriminatory admissions policies violated federal public policy, and concluded that the decision in Green v.
Connally 52 had demonstrated that such admission policies violated federal public policy as declared by the Constitution, federal statutes, and Supreme Court decisions. Finally, the court
considered whether denying the school exempt status would violate the first amendment and concluded that "incidental distinctions in government treatment of religions which indirectly arise
from the valid exercise of legitimate governmental interests are
not prohibited by either the Establishment or the Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment."53 On appeal, the Fourth Cir-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Goldsboro, 436 F. Supp. at 1317.
Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1318.
356 U.S. 30 (1958).
Goldsboro, 436 F. Supp. at 1318.
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
Goldsboro, 436 F. Supp. at 1319. The school also argued that denying its tax
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cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court,
holding that the
decision was controlled by the principles stated
5 4
in Bob Jones.

III. ANALYSIS
The issue upon which Bob Jones and Goldsboro undoubtedly will be decided is one of authority. Until the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, the government's argument was essentially that the IRS had the authority to deny tax exemption to
organizations that discriminate on the basis of race. Such denials
would be required because of the failure of the organization to
conform to the public policy against racial discrimination. Although the United States still maintains that there is a "firm
and uncontrovertible policy against racial discrimination,"5 5 the
government has repudiated its earlier position on the authority
of the IRS.56
A.

IRS Authority

The IRS revoked the tax exemptions of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools based on its interpretation
of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 57 The IRS
reasoned that Congress intended to exempt only charitable organizations from taxation under section 501(c)(3). No organization,
however, is charitable if it violates a clearly defined public polexemption would violate the fifth amendment. The district court did not address this
argument. Id.
54. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, No. 81-1473 (4th Cir. Feb.
24, 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
55. U.S. Brief, supra note 42, at 12.
56. Id. at 13.
57. I.R.C. § 501 (West Supp. 1982) states:
(a) Exemption from taxation-An organization described in subsection (c)
or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.
(c) The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a):
(3) Corporations and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition, ... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals ....

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss4/3
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icy. Therefore, schools that discriminate on the basis of race
must be denied tax exemption.
As the government since has acknowledged, the IRS interpretation of 501(c)(3) was incorrect. 58 It is unlikely that Congress intended to grant tax exemptions to organizations of each
type listed in section 501(c)(3) solely because they function as
charities.59 Both sections 170 and 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code use the word "charitable" in two different senses. In a specific, common law sense "charitable" describes a particular type
of organization.60 A taxpayer may deduct his contributions to
such organizations,61 and they are exempt from taxation. 2 In a
general sense, "charitable" describes contributions made to a
class of organizations that are similar to common law charitable
organizations in that they benefit society."3 That class is referred
to elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code merely as "organizations, 6 4 indicating that the adjective "charitable" was ascribed
to the class more as a matter of convenience than for purposes
of legal definition. Imposing principles of the common law of
charitable trusts on organizations that are charitable in the specific sense is reasonable. But to impose that law on the class
comprising religious, scientific, literary, educational, safety testing, and anticruelty organizations that are charitable in the general sense would not be reasonable. Such organizations need not
benefit society in the same manner as charitable organizations.
If Congress had intended to exempt these organizations solely
because they benefit society in the same manner as charitable
organizations, it could have drafted an exemption for organizations serving charitable purposes rather than separately listing
each type of organization. By listing each type of organization
along with charitable organizations, Congress manifested its intent that the organizations should be taxexempt because of the
unique manner in which each benefits society, rather than because of the charitable purposes the organization might serve. 5

58. U.S. Brief, supra note 42, at 12-18.
59. But see Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.D.C. 1971).

60. "Religious" also seems to be used in this sense.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B)(West Supp. 1982).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(West Supp. 1982).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(West Supp. 1982).
I.R.C. § 170(c)(West Supp. 1982).
The Treasury Department's Regulations further support this conclusion. See
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As an alternate basis for revoking the tax exemptions of
Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, the IRS
relied on Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner8 for the proposition that" 'tax benefits such as deductions and exclusions generally are subject to limitation on public policy grounds.' " In
Tank Truck, the United States Supreme Court upheld the IRS
determination that a trucking company could not deduct the
cost of traffic fines as ordinary and necessary business expenses
under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. 8 The holding
in Tank Truck was narrow: a business expense is not necessary
if deducting the expense "would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct."""
The Court also qualified its holding in Tank Truck by stating that a presumption against congressional intent to grant tax
benefits for conduct that frustrated public policy could not "be
viewed or applied in any absolute sense. ' 70 Whether a presumption against deductability or exemption should apply is determined by "the severity and immediacy of the frustration result71
ing from allowance of the deduction" or exemption.
The Tank Truck decision is readily distinguishable from the
facts in Bob Jones and Goldsboro7 s because of differences in the
effect of the tax relief granted. In Tank Truck, the deductions
for specific expenses made those expenses less costly for the
company. Because the expenses in question were traffic fines,
the deductions resulted in a reduction in the cost of breaking
the law. But in the school cases, the tax exemptions are not related to any specific expenses. Because of the indirect relationship of the tax exemptions to the schools' policies, it is not clear
that tax exemptions have the effect of encouraging a particular
policy. Even if there were a relationship between tax exemption
and the schools' racially based policies, the policies are not illegal. The schools may, without penalty, retain their policies after

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(1) and (2)(1982).
66. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
67. U.S. Brief, supra note 42, at 24-25.
68. 356 U.S. at 32.
69. Id. at 33.
70. Id. at 35.
71. Id.
72. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 902-905; U.S. Brief, supra
note 42, at 24-26.
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losing their tax exemptions. Thus, allowing the schools to keep
their tax exemptions would not have an immediate or severe adverse effect on the public policy against racial discrimination.
B. Federal Policy
The attempt by the IRS in Bob Jones to impose common
law charitable requirements on organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) caused some confusion for the court of appeals. 3
The court stated that the school's "racial policies violated the
clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial discrimination and, more specifically, the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in education, public or private. 74 The Bob Jones opinion obscures the
distinction between two separate policy arguments advanced
against allowing tax exemption for private schools with racially
based policies.
The first argument is that the organization's conduct - discriminating on the basis of race - violates public policy. Denial
of tax exemption would follow, under the IRS view, either because the organization had failed to meet the requirements for a
common law charitable organization or because of the presumption that Congress did not intend that the tax laws benefit any
organization whose conduct violates public policy. If the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) and its view of the holding in
Tank Truck are incorrect, this argument does not apply to religious or educational exemptions under section 501(c)(3) because
the IRS has no authority to limit the exemptions based on pub73. Referring to the District of Columbia circuit's opinion in Green v. Connally,
Judge Hall wrote: "In that persuasive and scholarly opinion, Judge Leventhal viewed
section 501(c)(3) against its background of charitable trusts, concluding that to be eligible under that section, an institution must be 'charitable' in the broad common law
sense, and therefore must not violate public policy." 639 F.2d at 151 (footnote and citation omitted). In fact, Judge Leventhal's opinion expressly disclaimed the common law
of charitable organizations as the basis for his holding in Green:
Taking into account the sensitive and crucial nature of the issue of racially
discriminatory schools and the existence ... of a federal policy derived from
Congressional enactment as well as the Constitution itself, it is our conclusion
that the ultimate criterion for determination whether such schools are eligible
under the 'charitable' organization provisions of the Code rests not on a common law referent but on that Federal policy.
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.D.C. 1971) (emphasis added).
74. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 151.
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lic policy. Nevertheless, the argument easily could become applicable if Congress were to amend section 501(c)(3) to impose a
public policy limitation on exemptions for religious and educational organizations.
The second argument is that the IRS conduct - allowing
tax exemption to organizations that discriminate - violates federal policy against government support for discrimination. Denial of the exemption follows solely on the basis of the federal
policy. This argument applies to government support of any
type of organization, regardless of whether it is a common law
charitable organization and regardless of presumptions of congressional intent in enacting the tax laws. Thus, even if the IRS
interpretation of section 501(c)(3) and its view of the holding in
Tank Truck are incorrect, this argument could still be made
against religious and educational exemptions for discriminatory
schools.
A third argument, not considered in Bob Jones, has since
been advanced by amici. 5 The argument is similar to the second
argument in that it focuses on conduct of the IRS. By allowing
tax exemptions to religious organizations that discriminate while
denying exemptions to nonreligious organizations that discriminate, the IRS violates federal policy against government support
for religion. As with the second argument, denial of the exemption is not based on statutory interpretation but follows solely
on the basis of the federal policy.
Although determining the scope of IRS authority may decide the Bob Jones and Goldsboro cases, it will not resolve the
underlying issue of whether the public policies against government support for religion and racial discrimination may defeat a
religious school's claims of taxexempt status. Nor will it resolve
the question of the constitutionality of a congressionally imposed public policy limitation on tax exemptions for religious
schools. Resolution of these issues requires analysis of the nature
and scope of the policies and their relationship to the religious
guarantees of the first amendment.
Amici have stated that the policy against government sup-

75. See, e.g., Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish
Committee, Amici Curiae at 53-54, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 146 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). (argued Oct. 12, 1982)(available Nov. 1,
1982 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file)[hereinafter cited as A.C.L.U. Brief].
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port of racial discrimination has constitutional dimensions."6 Indeed, the NAACP has argued that if the Bob Jones University
and Goldsboro Christian Schools tax exemptions were not invalidated on statutory grounds, the result would be compelled by
the first, fifth, and thirteenth amendments. 7 Each of the policies is purportedly "rooted in our Constitution,

78

but as applied

to tax exemptions for private religious schools with racially
based policies, each antidiscrimination policy sweeps more
broadly than the Constitution.
1. First Amendment-Establishment Clause
It has been argued that allowing tax exemption to private
religious schools with racially based policies while denying exemptions to private sectarian schools with similar policies violates the establishment clause of the first amendment.7 9 Evaluation of this argument requires an understanding of the
relationship between tax exemption and the establishment
clause.
The Supreme Court traditionally has viewed the establishment clause as prohibiting government sponsorship of religion.
In economic terms, the Court often has inquired whether a particular state or federal program aided religion in a way that
amounted to impermissible sponsorship or support. The Court's
decisions have focused on two separate issues: first, whether the
benefit was the type of aid prohibited under the establishment
clause;80 and second, whether the benefit flowed directly to
religion.8 1
76. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892
(1981) (argued Oct. 12, 1982) (available Nov. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file
at s. 19)[hereinafter cited as N.A.A.C.P. Brief] (References to the location of material
within a LEXIS document are by pages as they appear on the viewing screen. Thus a
reference to s. 19 indicates that the material will appear on the nineteenth "screenful" of
the document). Accord Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1161.
77. N.A.A.C.P. Brief, supra note 76, at s. 10.
78. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 151.
79. A.C.L.U. Brief, supra note 75, at 33.
80. See, e.g., Wollman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee For Public Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
81. See, e.g., Wollman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Public
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1972); Tilton v. Richardson,
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The Court determined in Walz v. Tax Commission, 2 that
tax exemptions are not the type of aid prohibited by the establishment clause. Chief Justice Burger analyzed the problem using a precursor of the now standard three-part equal protection
analysis.8 3 The Court first focused on the purpose of the exemption to determine whether it advanced or inhibited religion."
The Court stated that religious and other exempt organizations
such as hospitals and libraries have a "beneficial and stabilizing
influence in community life."'8 5 Because of that beneficial influ-

ence, religious organizations have been exempted from taxation.
The Court noted that the exemption for religion was not made
available on the basis of social services performed for the community.8 6 This distinguishes religious organizations from com-

mon law charities which are classified as charitable, in part, because they reduce the government's economic burden by7
providing services which government would otherwise provide.

403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
83. See supra text accompanying note 40, see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612 (1971). First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion and
finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id.
84. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 672.
85. Id. at 674.
86. The Court stated:
We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social welfare
services or good works that some churches perform for parishioners and othersfamily counselling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to children. Churches
vary substantially in the scope of such services; programs expand or contract
according to resources and need. As public-sponsored programs enlarge, private aid from the church sector may diminish. The extent of social services
may vary, depending on whether the church serves an urban or rural, a rich or
poor constituency. To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of
religious bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and
standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing
a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality
seeks to minimize. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant
element to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to constitutional dimensions.
Id.
87. Compare the majority view stated supra note 86, with Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, 397 U.S. at 687-689. Justice Brennan noted that religious organizations
were exempted from taxation for two reasons: (1) because they relieve the community of
the financial burden of providing social services and (2) because they foster pluralism in
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Thus, the purpose of tax exemption is to relieve from the burden of taxation a broad class of organizations that benefit the
community.
The Court appears to have merged the question of whether
the primary effect of a tax exemption advances or inhibits religion with an analysis of whether the exemption causes excessive
entanglement between religion and government.8s This analysis
suggests that the Court assumed that the effect of the exemption
was permissible and moved directly to the question of entanglement. The Court addressed both problems of administrative and
ideological entanglement.
The Court compared the entangling effects of government
administration of taxation and exemption. It found that taxation, unlike exemption, would involve government in "continuing surveillance" of religion."9 Hence taxation, like the grant of a
direct money subsidy, would result in administrative entanglement of prolonged duration. In contrast, an exemption, because
it is determined only once, does not produce excessive administrative entanglement.
The presence or absence of ideological entanglement is central to establishment clause analysis.9 0 In Walz, the Court
clearly stated that "[t]he grant of tax exemption is not sponsorship" 91 because the government has no interest in money that it
has not yet exacted from its citizens. Religious organizations
may benefit by their tax exemptions, but this benefit, while perhaps quantitatively the same as a benefit conferred by a direct
money subsidy, does not connote government support. As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion:
[t]ax exemptions and general subsidies ... are qualitatively
different. Though both provide economic assistance, they do so
in fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves the direct
transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and uses
resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption on
the other hand involves no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by relieving a privately
society. The first of these reasons is the usual justification for charitable tax exemptions

and was rejected by the majority as the basis for its holding.
88.
89.
90.
91.

397 U.S. at 674.
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 675.
Id.
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funded venture of the burden of paying taxes.9 2
Because exemption entails no ideological entanglement and the
level of administrative entanglement is less than that generated
by taxation, the Court found that exemption for religious organizations did not excessively entangle government with religion.
Walz clearly demonstrates that tax exemption is neutral for purposes of establishment clause analysis and does not establish
religion.
The argument that denying tax exemptions to private secular schools that discriminate while allowing exemption to private
sectarian schools that discriminate violates the establishment
clause assumes that private secular schools that discriminate are
denied tax exemption by the IRS. Presently, the IRS is enjoined
from approving tax exemptions to private secular schools in
Mississippi which exclude black students. 93 The IRS also is enjoined, by a separate order, from granting or restoring federal
tax exemptions to "any school that unlawfully discriminates on
the basis of race.194 The wholesale denial of tax exemptions to
secular schools, if valid, 5 might appear to require revocation of
92. Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring)(footnote omitted).
93. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179-80 (D.D.C. 1971).
94. Wright v. Regan, 49 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 82-531 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 1982)(continuing an injunction granted February 18, 1982, Wright v. Regan, 49 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H)
82-439 (D.C. Cir.)). Much of the long and tortuous history of Green v. Connally, Green
v.Regan, and Wright v. Regan is traced by Judge Ginsburg in Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d
820, 823-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Before the District of Columbia District Court issued its injunction on February 18,
1982, the IRS already had taken steps to revoke the revenue rulings and procedures
upon which it had based the revocation of the tax exemptions for Bob Jones University
and Goldsboro Christian Schools. Memorandum for the United States, Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)(argued Oct. 11,
1982)(available Nov. 1, 1982 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). The rulings involved
were: Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587; Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 7254, 1972-2 C.B. 834; and Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Following the filing of its
Memorandum with the Court, the IRS instructed its regional commissioners to suspend
any examination of charitable, religious, educational, or scientific organizations that involved a "public policy exemption qualification requirement." In September, 1982 the
IRS modified its prior instructions. The current policy is to suspend review of exemptions in cases in which the exemption would be lost solely on the basis of public policy.
I.R.S. Administration Manual 7(10) 30-2 (Sept. 17, 1982)(available Jan. 4, 1983 on
LEXIS, Fedtax library, Manual file).
95. The argument that denying tax exemption to private secular schools with racially based policies does not violate the first amendment freedom of association is based
on Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Although the Supreme Court's
opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), may lend some support to a related
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tax exemptions for religious schools on establishment grounds.
proposition, the logic of the argument advanced in Green is flawed.
In Green the court of appeals rejected the intervenors' argument that the Supreme
Court's decision in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), prevented the IRS from denying a group's tax exemption because of the group's beliefs or opinions. In Speiser, the
Court ruled on a limitation to California's property tax exemption for veterans. The exception, contained in the state constitution, was limited to persons who did not advocate
overthrowing the federal or state government by unlawful means. A California statute
required that veterans file a form containing an oath that they did not advocate overthrowing the government by unlawful means. Failure to subscribe to the oath resulted in
the loss of exemption. Id. at 516-17.
The California exemption scheme raised two constitutional questions. First, did the
constitutional limitation on exemptions for those advocating overthrow of the government violate their first amendment right to free speech? Second, did the statutory requirement of an oath restrict the exercise of a constitutional right without the procedural
safeguards required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment? The Court
found the statute unconstitutional because it lacked the procedural safeguards required
by the fourteenth amendment. The Court did not, however, decide the first question
raised in the case. Because the California Supreme Court had construed the state constitutional provision as denying tax exemption only to "persons who engage in proscribed
speech for which they might be fined or imprisoned," the United States Supreme Court
"assumed without deciding" that the provision did not violate the first amendment. Id.
at 520.
The clear implication of the dicta in Speiser is that an exemption scheme which
denied exemptions to persons for engaging in lawful speech or association would violate
the first amendment. Even the Green court realized that private, segregated education-unlike the criminal syndicalism at issue in Speiser-was not illegal: "[n]either
plaintiffs' prayers nor defendants' [exemption] policy seek to stop intervenors from sending their children to segregated private schools . . . ." Green at 1166. The fact that
schools with racially based policies would be allowed to retain those policies after losing
their tax exemptions demonstrates that denial of the exemptions on the basis of those
policies violates the first amendment.
Although Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), expanded the scope of civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to cover discrimination in private school admissions, it does
not compel a different conclusion. The civil liability provided by § 1981 does not make
an act illegal in the sense that criminal syndicalism was illegal in Speiser. Furthermore,
it appears unlikely that racially based policies such as that of Bob Jones University falls
within the scope of section 1981. See infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
The Green court's attempt to avoid Speiser's dicta resulted in an illogical application of the holding of the case. The court of appeals stated:
In Speiser the statutory scheme was offensive because it operated to chill
speech that was permissible, because of fears that the veterans might be unable to establish its permissibility. It is not remotely suggested by intervenors
that they fear lest schools will undertake only activities that are innocent, i.e.,
not racially discriminatory, yet wrongfully condemned as discriminatory.
Green at 1166-67. The problem, of course, is that the question is not whether the
school's policies are discriminatory but whether the discrimination is protected association under the first amendment. If, as Speiser suggests, legal speech or association is
protected by the first amendment and, as Green states, segregated education is a legal
form of association, the Green court's conclusion does not follow. The question presented
in Speiser, whether revoking tax exemptions without procedural safeguards for engaging
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However, this argument ignores the differences in the ways that
secular and sectarian schools serve the purpose for which their
tax exemptions were granted.
Private secular schools are exempt solely because the educational function they serve fulfills the purpose for which educational tax exemptions are granted. In contrast, private religious
schools are exempt for two reasons. The educational function of
the schools serves the purpose for which educational exemptions
are granted and the religious function of the schools serves the
purposes for which religious exemptions are granted. Regardless
of whether the purposes served by educational and religious exemptions are the same, the purposes certainly are not served the
same way by education and by religion. A general denial of tax
exemptions for private, secular, discriminatory schools would be
based upon a determination that those schools do not fulfil -the
purpose for which educational exemptions are granted. Such a
determination would not foreclose tax exemption for private religious schools. A private religious school with a discriminatory
policy based upon religious belief would still retain its tax exemption as a religious organization.
2. Fifth Amendment-Equal Protection
One of the major arguments against tax exemption for
schools such as Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
Schools is that the exemption amounts to state aid to racial discrimination,98 in violation of the equal protection component of
the fifth amendment's due process clause. In determining that
tax exemption aided the discriminatory policy of Bob Jones University, Judge Hall's opinion for the Fourth Circuit relied heav97
ily on the Supreme Court's decision in Norwood v. Harrison.
In Norwood, the Court held that Mississippi's program of loaning state-purchased textbooks to students enrolled in private
secular schools with discriminatory admissions policies violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The

in illegal speech would chill protected speech, is not present in Green because the loss of
tax exemption was caused by intervenors engaging in a legal form of assocation.
96. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 152 n.7; A.C.L.U. Brief, supra
note 75, at 61.
97. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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Court based its decision on the nature of the aid provided to the
schools and the relationship of the schools' functions to their
discriminatory policies. In Bob Jones, the court of appeals reasoned that if loaning textbooks to private secular schools that
discriminate violated the equal protection clause, granting tax
exemptions for private religious schools that discriminate must
violate federal policy against supporting racial discrimination. 8
While the cases are analogous in some respects, close analysis of

the Supreme Court's rationale in Norwood indicates that the opposite result should be reached in cases such as Bob Jones or
Goldsboro.
The nature of the aid provided to the schools was an important factor in the decision in Norwood. The Supreme Court
compared textbook loans with the tuition grants which the
Court previously had held were unavailable to private schools
that discriminate.9 Textbook loans and tuition grants are similar in that both are tangible forms of financial aid and both directly benefit schools. 100 Tax exemption, however, is clearly distinguishable, for it is neither tangible financial aid nor the type
of direct benefit to schools contemplated by the Court in
Norwood.
In Norwood, the Court reasoned that by providing tangible
financial aid the state supported discrimination in private
schools. 101 The Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission'10 demonstrates that tax exemption is not tangible

financial aid. After describing the problems inherent in a state's
providing "direct money subsidies" for churches, the Court
stated:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches
but simply abstains from demanding that the church support
the state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has
converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into
arms of the
' 03
state or put employees "on the public payroll.'

98. 639 F.2d at 152 n.7.
99. 413 U.S. at 463. See, e.g., Brown v. South Carolina Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp.
199 (D.S.C. 1968) aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968).
100. 413 U.S. at 464.
101. Id. at 464-65.
102. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
103. Id. at 675. See Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
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Just as tax exemption for religious organizations does not connote state sponsorship of religion, tax exemption for private

schools with discriminatory
policies does not connote state sup04
port of those policies.1
Furthermore, tax exemption does not provide the same type
of direct benefit to schools as does a loan of textbooks. In Norwood, the Court distinguished the textbook lending program
from generalized government services such as police and fire

protection which also benefit discriminatory private schools. 05
The distinction was based on two factual differences. First, textbooks are provided only to schools, while government services
are provided to schools in common with other organizations such
as hospitals or churches. Second, textbooks are readily available

From Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes
and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing"the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YAL.E L.J. 51
(1972).
104. Some commentators have suggested that the threshold of government involvement with private action necessary for a finding of state action "is lower when racial
discrimination is alleged than when the establishment clause is invoked." Comment, The
Tax-Exempt Status of SectarianEducationalInstitutionsthat Discriminateon the Basis of Race, 65 IOWA L. Rav. 258, 269 n.97 (1979). See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 463,
470 (1973). Analysis of the Supreme Court's recent equal protection cases indicates that
the Court's approach is nearly identical in both types of cases.
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court considered whether
issuing a state liquor license to a private club that did not allow black members or visitors amounted to state action. The Court found no state action, noting that there was no
continuing relationship between the licensing board and the lodge of the type that existed in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and that the licensing authority played no part in establishing or enforcing the discriminatory policy.
407 U.S. at 175. In what was perhaps an even more sensitive test for state action, Justice
Brennan focused on whether the state's liquor regulations "intertwine[d] the State with
the operation of the Lodge . . . in a 'significant way.'" Id. at 186 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Applying the majority analysis from Moose Lodge to the facts in Bob Jones and
Goldsboro indicates that tax exemption could not be considered state action. In neither
case is there a continuing relationship of the type found in Burton, nor did the IRS play
any part in establishing or enforcing the school's policies. Moreover, even applying the
more sensitive test formulated by the dissenters in Moose Lodge would not result in a
finding of state action. The question of whether the state and the discriminatory organization are significantly intertwined is virtually identical to that part of the Court's establishment clause test which asks whether church and state are excessively entangled. See,
e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), the Court applied the entanglement test to the question of tax exemptions and
found that they do not excessively entangle church and state. See supra notes 82-92 and
accompanying text. Similarly, tax exemptions for religious organizations that maintain
policies of racial separation do not amount to state action.
105. 413 U.S. at 465.
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from other sources, while government services are available only
from the state. In light of these distinctions, the benefit conferred upon schools through tax exemption appears similar to
those provided by generalized government services. Tax exemption, like government services, is available to schools in common
with other organizations and is available only from the state.
Unlike loans of textbooks, the nature of the aid provided by tax
exemption aid to schools with discriminatory policies does not
involve government with those policies in a way that violates the
equal protection clause.
A second important factor in the decision in Norwood was
the relationship of the functions of the schools to their discriminatory policies. The Court distinguished loans of textbooks to
private secular schools which discriminate from bus fares and
textbooks made available to students of private religious schools
under programs upheld in Everson v. Board of Education06 and
Board of Education v. Allen. 0 7 The programs upheld in Everson
and Allen did not violate the establishment clause by providing
state aid to religion because the religious and educational functions of these schools were deemed separable. The government
programs aided only the secular educational function of the
schools and did not tend to establish the religious function of
the schools. In contrast, the educational function of a private
secular school "cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices."108 The discriminatory policies of a secular school
are
10 9
philosophy.
educational
school's
the
of
part
viewed as
Analyzing the relationship of a school's functions to its discriminatory policies is considerably more difficult when the
school is religious rather than secular. When, as in Norwood, the
sole function of the school is educational, the policies of the
school logically spring from the administration's educational
philosophy. But when the functions are educational and religious, a court must inquire whether the educational and religious functions are separable and whether the discriminatory
policy springs from religious beliefs. The Supreme Court has
made similar inquiries in several of its first amendment religion

106. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
107. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
108. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 469.
109. Id.
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cases.
In determining whether religious and educational functions
are separate, the Court has considered several factors. If religious indoctrination is a purpose of the school, it is not likely
that religious and educational instruction will be separate."1"
Even if indoctrination is not the school's purpose, religion may
be so much a part of the school's activities that the school becomes "pervasively sectarian." ' ' Under current establishment
clause analysis, a school that is pervasively religious is ineligible
for tangible state aid. Every part of the school's program is
deemed so closely related to the school's religious function that
aiding any part would establish religion. Consequently, if a pervasively religious school has a racially discriminatory policy, it
too would be deemed a part of the school's religious function. 12
If, however, a school with separable religious and educational
functions has a discriminatory policy, a court would have to inquire further to determine whether the policy is motivated by
religious belief or educational philosophy.
In the context of its free exercise cases, the Supreme Court
has considered several factors to determine whether particular
actions are motivated by sincerely held religious belief. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"13 the Court first focused on whether the practice in question was rooted in some religious authority. Second,
the Court considered whether the believers consistently practiced what they believed. Finally, the Court considered whether
the practice had been unchanged over time. The Amish practice
of separating from worldliness was found to be motivated by religious belief because it was rooted in their interpretation of the
Bible, practiced consistently, and adhered to for many years." 4
A court could apply the same analysis in an equal protection
context to determine whether a school's discriminatory policy
was motivated by sincere religious belief.
Thorough analysis of equal protection problems presented

110. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
111. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
112. But see Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977)(evidence indicated that religious school's policy was not religiously motivated). Compare id.
at 315 (Goldberg, J., concurring)("religious concepts, even when imperfectly expressed,
should not be denigrated into non-religion").
113. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
114. Id. at 216.
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in Bob Jones and Goldsboro requires consideration of the interaction of the factors discussed by the Court in Norwood and the
discriminatory intent requirement developed in cases subsequently decided. 115 The aid and relationship factors discussed in
116
Norwood may be combined in eight different ways.
In any of the cases in which aid is intangible financial aid,

such as tax exemption, there would be no equal protection violation because such aid does not provide state support for the
views held by the taxexempt organization. When the aid is tan-

gible, such as textbook loans, the existence of state support for a
school's discriminatory policies would depend upon the relation-

115. E.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
116.
Tangible Financial
Aid

Type of School

Intangible Aid
(E.g., Tax Exemption)

Secular School
(Discriminatory Policy
Based on Educational
Philosophy)
Pervasively Sectarian
School
(Discriminatory Policy
Based on Religious
Belief)

No aid allowed
(equal protection
violation; e.g., Norwood)

No aid allowed
(policy violation; e.g.
Green).

No aid allowed
(establishment clause
violation)

School with Separable
Religious and Educational
Functions
(Discriminatory Policy
Based on Educational
Philosophy)
School with Separable
Religious and Educational
Functions
(Discriminatory Policy
Based on Religious
Belief)

No aid allowed
(equal protection
violation)

Aid allowed
(no equal protection or
establishment clause
violation because aid is
intangible; no policy
violation because the
religiously-based policy
is protected by free
exercise clause)
No aid allowed
(policy violation)

Aid allowed
(no equal protection or
establishment clause
violations because aid
does not go to religion;
no policy violation
because the religiouslybased policy is protected
by free exercise clause)

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

Aid allowed
(no equal protection or
establishment clause
violations because aid
does not go to religion;
no policy violation
because the religiouslybased policy is protected
by free exercise clause)

25

910

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

ship of the functions of the school to the discriminatory policy.
In the case of a secular school, a direct relationship exists between the educational function of the school and the discriminatory policy. Thus, tangible aid to the school would support the
policy. In the case of a pervasively religious school, the discriminatory policy presumably would be motivated by religious beliefs. Irrespective of whether tangible aid to such a school would
violate the equal protection clause, it certainly would violate the
establishment clause. If the discriminatory policy of a school
with separable educational and religious functions were motivated by educational philosophy, tangible aid to the educational
function would amount to support for the policy. However, if the
discriminatory policy were motivated by sincere religious belief,
tangible aid to the school's educational function would not support the policy.
The existence of incidental state support for a school's discriminatory policy may not by itself amount to a violation of
equal protection if unaccompanied by discriminatory intent."1In Norwood, the Court did not make the kind of searching inquiry into the intent of the Mississippi legislature evident in
cases following Washington v. Davis."' The Court in Norwood
stated:
We need not assume that the State's textbook aid to private
schools has been motivated by other than a sincere interest in
the educational welfare of all Mississippi children. But good
intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to negate the
State's involvement in violation of constitutional duty." 9
Arguably, Norwood might be decided differently under the discriminatory intent standard that has since become a part of
equal protection analysis.
As the preceding analysis suggests, allowing Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools to claim tax exemptions
under section 501(c)(3) does not offend the equal protection
clause. Because tax exemption is not tangible financial aid, it

117. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax
Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and
Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 229 (1979).
118. 426 U.S. 229 (1975); Compare Feeney, 442 U.S. at 276-80 with Norwood, 413
U.S. at 466.
119. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 466.
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does not connote government support of school policies school.
Furthermore, even if government support were present, proving
that Congress intended section 501(c)(3) to benefit schools with
12 0
racially based policies would be very difficult.
3.

Thirteenth Amendment-Badges and Incidents of Slavery

To the extent that the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Bob
Jones and Goldsboro rest upon the thirteenth amendment, the
court's reliance is misplaced. The court cited Runyon v. McCrary121 for the proposition that, "in a non-religious setting...
the equal right to contract provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits
racial discrimination in nonpublic school admission policies. 122
The court stated that "[s]imilar considerations apply in a religious setting, '123 but neither the thirteenth amendment nor the
legislation enacted to enforce it require the result reached in
Bob Jones and Goldsboro.
In Runyon, parents of two black children brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 against two private, secular schools
which denied their children admission based on discriminatory
admission policies. The Court affirmed the appellate court decision that section 1981 was applicable, and that its application
did not offend the first or fourteenth amendments. Section 1981,
a codification of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,12' was
enacted under the legislative authority of section 2 of the thirteenth amendment.1 25 Section 1981 specifically guarantees to
"all persons ... the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens. 1' 26 By analogy to its
holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 1 27 the Court reasoned
that "a Negro's § 1 right to 'make and enforce contracts' is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely be-

120. U.S. Brief, supra note 42, at 38-42.
121. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

122. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 151.
123. Id.
124. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8.
125. Id. at 179. The thirteenth amendment states that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction ....
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 1981).
127. 392 U.S. 409 (1968)(construing 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
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cause he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts
as he extends to white offerees." 12 8 The Court found that the
discriminatory admission policies violated petitioner's rights
under section 1981 because the schools "advertised and offered
[their services] to members of the general public,"' 2 9 yet refused
to contract with petitioners because they were black.
The most obvious distinction between Runyon and the Bob
Jones and Goldsboro cases is that in the latter two cases no
plaintiffs seek redress for violations of their section 1981 rights.
The Fourth Circuit does not suggest that actual section 1981 violations occurred in Bob Jones and Goldsboro. Rather, its citations to Runyon and section 1981 in the Bob Jones opinion suggest that, given a hypothetical plaintiff, the school's policy would
violate section 1981 and the thirteenth amendment. Therefore,
by implication, the policy should be held to violate federal public policy. Conceding, for the purposes of this discussion, the validity of such an argument, the question becomes whether a hypothetical plaintiff could prevail against either Bob Jones
University or Goldsboro Christian Schools on the basis of section 1981.
The Bob Jones University policy against interracial dating
does not affect black applicants' rights to contract. 3 0 A cause of
action under section 1981 asserts that the offeror has refused to
extend to blacks the same offer made to the general public. Bob
Jones University, however, contracts for educational services
with all students upon the same terms. The central theme of the
school's policy is that "[s]tudents who date outside their own
race will be expelled."1 31 This policy applies to all students, regardless of race. Thus, Caucasian and Mongolian students, as
well as Negro students, are prohibited from dating students of
other races. 132 Enjoining the rule under section 1981 would not

128. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170-71.
129. Id. at 172.
130. See supra note 4.
131. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 895.
132. The Court rejected a related, though distinguishable, argument in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
In Loving a racially mixed couple attacked the constitutionality of Virginia statutes
which prohibited marriage of" 'white persons'" and " 'colored persons and Indians.'"
Id. at 5 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960)). They did not, however, prevent intermarriage by non-whites. Id. at 11.
Virginia argued that the statutes did not violate the equal protection clause of the
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give black students an equal right to contract, but would, in effect, give them greater rights since they could then date students
of any race while white students could date only within their
own race.
The Goldsboro policy of excluding blacks does affect black
applicants' rights to contract.1 3 However, it would be a mistake
to conclude, on that basis alone, that the result in Goldsboro is
controlled by Runyon. In Runyon, the schools had offered their
services to the general public; petitioners' children were denied
admission solely because they were black. In Goldsboro, the district court made no finding as to whether the school offered its
services to the public. The court did assume that the school
based its admissions policy on religious belief. 34 The court's
opinion does not clarify whether a black applicant would be denied admission to the Goldsboro school solely because he is
black or because of the school's assumption, perhaps unfounded,
that a black student would not share the school's religious belief
against interracial dating and marriage. If the school normally
offered its services only to those in agreement with its religious
beliefs rather than to the general public, its policy might reflect
what Justice Powell termed " 'a purpose of exclusiveness' other
than the desire to bar members of the Negro race." '35 The majority in Runyon expressly left open the question of the validity
of a basis for exclusion other than race. 36 Furthermore, the limifourteenth amendment since the statutes imposed equal penalties upon the white and
colored partners to the interracial marriage. Id. at 8.The Court's response was that despite the equal punishment under the statutes, "[t]he fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriage involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classification [s]
. . . [are] measures designed to maintain White Supremacy." Id. at 11.

Bob Jones is distinguishable because its dating policies prevent dating between different nonwhite racial groups as well as between whites and non-whites. The importance
of this distinction, however, may have been minimized by the Court's observation in
Loving that statutes were "repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an
even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all races." Id. at 1112. The more
important distinction between two cases is that unlike the statute at issue in Loving, the
policies in Bob Jones and Goldsboro are purely private. Any student who found the policies objectionable could avoid them by withdrawing from school. There, the impact of
the policies of the schools upon students is far less severe than the impact of Virginia's
statute upon interracial couples.
133. Unlike Bob Jones, Goldsboro does not admit black students. The school has,
however, occasionally accepted non-Caucasian students. Goldsboro,436 F. Supp. at 1317.
134. Id.
135. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 187-88 (Powell, J., concurring).
136. 427 U.S. at 172.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

tation of the holding to nonsectarian schools suggests that religious belief might have been contemplated by the Court as an
alternative basis for exclusion.13
The analysis developed in Runyon indicates that the policy
of Bob Jones University does not violate section 1981. Although
complete facts are unavailable, the analysis further suggests the
possibility that the policy of Goldsboro Christian Schools, as applied, does not violate the statute. In either case, however, inquiry into the effects of section 1981 on the respective policies is
speculative because no plaintiffs have come forward to assert
claims against the schools. The attempt of the Bob Jones court
to rely on section 1981 and the thirteenth amendment as authority for its public policy holding stretches the application of both
statute and amendment beyond what is warranted by the case.
Although each of the policies advanced against continued
tax exemption for the schools is derived from a particular constitutional provision, examination of the constitutional basis underlying each policy demonstrates that the policies have been
given a scope broader than the Constitution requires. While a
broad application of public policies may be desirable in some instances, public policy that is not mandated by the Constitution
cannot serve as a justification for overriding competing constitutional interests. 13 8 There is no constitutionally mandated interest served by invalidating the tax exemptions of the schools.
There are, however, constitutional provisions that are violated
by selectively invalidating tax exemptions for religious
organizations.
C.

Countervailing ConstitutionalProvisions
1.

Establishment Clause

The United States Supreme Court held in Walz v. Tax
Commission1 39 that tax exemption does not establish religion.
Although the Court determined that tax exemption was neutral
for purposes of establishment clause analysis, it based that con-

137. See id. at 168.
138. See Simon, The Tax Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious
Schools, 36 TAx L. Rav. 477, 500 (1981).
139. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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clusion on two conditions. First, tax exemptions must apply to
religious organizations in common with other organizations serving the same purposes - religion may not be benefitted more
than irreligion. Second, tax exemptions must apply to all religious organizations - some religions may not be benefitted
more than others. Tax exemptions available only to religious organizations or only to some religious organizations would not
satisfy the conditions required for religious exemptions to retain
their neutral character. 14 0
Selectively revoking the tax exemptions of some religious
schools clearly would undermine the second condition required
for a neutral tax exemption scheme. This type of selective revocation is precisely what the IRS has done with Fourth Circuit
approval in Bob Jones and Goldsboro. Limiting the availability
of religious tax exemptions opens the door for an establishment
clause argument against any religious exemption.
Of course, the Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires Congress to exempt religious organizations
from taxation. Apparently Congress could deny all religious tax
exemptions. The establishment clause does, however, require
that if tax exemptions are made available to any religious organization, they must be made available to all such organizations,
regardless of the content of their religious beliefs.
2. Free Exercise Clause
The United States Supreme Court has considered a wide
variety of free exercise claims since its initial interpretation of
the clause in 1878.141 Because of the diverse fact patterns of the
cases, the Court has had difficulty developing a consistent analytical approach. In recent years, the Court has relied heavily on
the balancing metaphor in developing its free exercise jurisprudence. The cases appear to be divisible into two classes. Each
class presents a different type of free exercise problem and
evokes a slightly different analytical approach from the Court.
Comparison of the two classes of cases demonstrates that the
Bob Jones and Goldsboro cases fall within the class in which the

140. See id. at 672-73.
141. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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Court has applied a two-tiered balancing test.'42 Application of
that test indicates that the indirect burden placed on the exercise of religion of each school by conditioning receipt of tax-exempt status upon abandonment of racially based policies violates the free exercise clause.
The two classes of free exercise cases might be termed exception cases and condition cases. The first class comprises cases
in which the party invoking the free exercise clause desired, for
religious reasons, either to refrain from conduct which the law
generally requires or to engage in conduct which the law generally prohibits. The second class comprises cases in which the
party invoking the free exercise clause was required by law to
meet some condition burdening his religious activities before exercising a right or enjoying a benefit.
a.

Exception Cases

In each of the exception cases, the religious beliefs of an in-

dividual or group conflicted with a general standard of conduct
required by government. In cases such as Reynolds v. United
States, 43 Prince v. Massachusetts,4 4 and Braunfeld v.

142. See infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text. In the two-tiered balancing test,
a sufficient degree of religious interest triggers a burden on the state to demonstrate a
compelling state interest and the lack of a less restrictive alternative; if the burden is
met, the statute is valid. In contrast, the balancing test used in cases such as Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) is ad hoc, requiring a relativistic weighing of interests not
present in the test used in cases such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See
Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YAE L.J. 350, 354 n.31 (1980); Contra Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1217,
1239-42; See generally Gianella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal
Development (Part I), 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
143. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds the Court determined that defendant, a Mormon, could not engage in the religiously motivated practice of polygamy. The Court held
that the government could, by general legislation, prevent some religious acts. Government interference with religion is not prevented by the free exercise clause when the
religion takes the form of" 'overt acts against peace and good order.' "Id. at 163 (quoting a bill authored by Thomas Jefferson; 1 Jefferson's Works, 45).
144. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the defendant was convicted of violating state
child labor laws after she allowed a minor child in her custody to distribute religious
literature on public streets. Although dissemination of religious literature was a part of
the religious belief of both her and the child, the Court determined that the defendant's
free exercise claim did not entitle her to an exemption from the child labor law. The
Court balanced the defendant's religiously motivated interest against the state's interest
in the child's welfare.
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Brown,145 the government standard was proscriptive - requiring
all citizens, regardless of religious belief, to refrain from particular conduct. In each of these cases the government's interest in
public safety, peace, or good order was found to justify the direct or indirect burden placed on religious belief by the statutes.
In cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder,146 the government standard
was prescriptive - requiring all citizens, regardless of their religious belief, to engage in particular conduct. These cases demonstrate the Court's unwillingness to require action which directly
burdens religious belief when the state's interest could be served
adequately by accommodating religion. 47
While a thorough analysis of the exception cases is beyond
the scope of this Note, recognizing the major distinction between
the exception and condition cases is important. In the exception
cases, particular conduct was required or prohibited for all citizens regardless of their religious belief. In the condition cases,
particular conduct was prevented or a government benefit withheld only so long as a condition was not met. No continuing requirement or prohibition existed. When the believer had satisfied the condition, conduct no longer was prevented nor
government benefits withheld.

145. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the plaintiffs claimed that a state law requiring them to close their businesses on Sunday violated their free exercise of religion
because their religious beliefs required them to close on Saturday. By requiring them to
close on Sunday, the law placed a burden on the plaintiffs' ability to close their business
on Saturday as mandated by their religion. The Court determined that the plaintiffs'
free exercise claim did not entitle them to an exception from the state's Sunday closing
law. The Court's determination was based on its balancing of plaintiffs' religiously motivated interest against the state's interest in providing a uniform day of rest for its
citizens.
146. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder the defendants were convicted of violating the
state's compulsory school attendance law. The defendants maintained that allowing their
children to attend public school past the eighth grade would violate their religious beliefs
and sought an exception from the general requirement. In determining that an exception
was available on free exercise grounds, the Court balanced the state's interest in educating its youth against the defendant's religiously motivated interest in avoiding formal
education. The Court held that the state's interest in continuing a child's education after
eighth grade to age sixteen was adequately served by the defendants' own system of
informal vocational education. See generally Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309 (1981)(analyzing the
Yoder opinion in detail).
147. But see United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1056 (1982)("broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system" would not be adequately served by allowing an
exception from employer's share of FICA and FUTA taxes for Amish employer).
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Condition Cases

The condition cases may be divided into subclasses according to the type of burden placed upon religion by the condition.
In some cases the condition at issue burdened religion directly
by preventing religious conduct until the condition was satisfied.
In other cases the condition at issue indirectly burdened religion. In these cases the condition itself did not prevent religious
conduct, because there was no requirement that one satisfy the
condition. However, by continuing to engage in some particular
religious conduct, it was impossible to satisfy the condition, and
consequently, impossible to exercise a valuable right or obtain a
valuable government benefit. Thus, the condition indirectly
made the religious conduct more burdensome.
Cantwell v. Connecticut' 8 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania' 9
both involved conditions, imposed upon the propagation of religion, which directly burdened religion. In Cantwell, three members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of violating a
Connecticut statute which required that any person soliciting

contributions for a religious or charitable cause first obtain a
certificate approving the cause.150 The members had solicited
donations without first obtaining official approval. After the
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, the members appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In addition
to the statutory violation, one of the members also was convicted of the common law crime of inciting others to breach of
the peace because a record that he had played while on the
street selling literature nearly provoked two men to attack him.
Although the Supreme Court disposed of the "incitement"
conviction by applying the free speech doctrine of clear and present danger,15 1 it first considered whether the statutory scheme
violated the petitioners' free exercise rights. 152 Justice Roberts
concluded that the purpose of the statute - preventing fraudu-

lent solicitation - was valid. He then focused on whether the
means employed to achieve that purpose unduly infringed upon

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

310 U.s. 296 (1940).
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
310 U.S. at 302.
Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 303.
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religious liberty. The statute required that a local official determine whether a cause was religious and, until that determination
was made, no solicitation could be undertaken. The Court found
that the statute violated the petitioners' freedom of religion because it imposed a condition - "a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause" 15 3 _ upon their right to
solicit contributions for their religion.
In Murdock, the petitioners were Jehovah's Witnesses convicted of violating a local ordinance requiring persons to pay a
license fee for the privilege of soliciting sales within the community. The petitioners accepted donations in exchange for religious literature. Although the amount of the donations requested was fixed, petitioners gave the literature to persons who
were unable to make a donation. The trial court found that distributing the literature in such a manner was selling, and therefore within the scope of the ordinance. After the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied petitions for leave to appeal, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that petitioners' selling activities were "merely incidental" to their primary objective of propagating their religious doctrines. 15 4 He
viewed the central issue in the case as "the constitutionality of
an ordinance which ... requires religious colporteurs to pay a
1 55
license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities.
Justice Douglas emphasized that the license fee was essentially a
tax imposed directly on petitioners' religious activities and thus
distinguishable from a tax on church property or income.1 56 Because engaging in religious activity is a privilege protected by
the free exercise clause, a state or municipality cannot condition
the exercise of that privilege upon payment of a tax.
In both Cantwell and Murdock, the Court was concerned
with the prohibitory effect of state and local laws on the propagation of religion, but the challenged laws conflicted with first
amendment freedom in different ways. The Connecticut statute
in Cantwell imposed a religiously based condition on religious
action. The statute violated the free exercise clause not only be-

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 307.
319 U.S. at 112.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 113.
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cause local officials were given discretion to determine whether a
cause was religious, but also because failure to satisfy the state
imposed condition prohibited religious activity. The local ordinance in Murdock imposed a neutral condition on religious action. The ordinance violated the free exercise clause not because
it imposed a license fee neutrally on all sellers, but because failure to pay the fee resulted in the prohibition of religious
activity.
While the conditions imposed in Cantwell and Murdock directly burdened religious activity, the Court has invalidated
other laws containing conditions that burdened religion indirectly. Torcaso v. Watkins157 and McDaniel v. Paty1 5s both involved indirect burdens on religion arising from religiously based
conditions placed on participation in the political process. In
Torcaso the appellant was denied a commission as a notary public when he refused to disclose his belief in God pursuant to a
Maryland constitutional provision requiring such a declaration
as a condition of holding public office in the state.1 59 On appeal,
the Maryland Supreme Court stated that Torcaso's religious
freedom was not affected by the law, because he was free to disbelieve and forgo holding office.1 60 After discussing the free exercise and establishment clauses, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Maryland decision on the basis of the free
exercise clause: "[tihis . . religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and reli161
gion and therefore cannot be enforced against him."
In McDaniel,the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Tennessee constitutional provision and related statute that
barred ministers from serving as legislators or delegites to the
state's constitutional convention. 6 2 McDaniel, a minister, was a

157. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
168., 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
159, 367 U.S. at 489.
160. Id. at 495.
161. Id. at 496.
162. 435 U.S. at 621. TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 1 provides:

Whereas Ministers of the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God
and the care of Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of
their functions; therefore, no Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the Legislature.
1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts 848 § 4 provides: "Any citizen of the state who can qualify for
membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly may become a
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candidate for delegate to the constitutional convention. One of
his opponents sued to have McDaniel's name removed from the
ballot because his candidacy violated the statute. The Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed a lower court determination that the
statute violated the first and fourteenth amendments, and held
that the statute restricted only religious action and not religious
163
belief as protected by the free exercise clause.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the Tennessee decision, but divided on their reasoning. In an
opinion joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, Chief
Justice Burger accepted the determination of the Tennessee Supreme Court that the statute regulated action rather than belief.
The definition of "minister" used in the Tennessee Constitution"" focused on the duties of a minister rather than the
strength of his beliefs, 65 indicating to the Chief Justice that the
statute might be a permissible regulation of individual actions
rather than a regulation of beliefs." 6 To determine whether the
restraint on religious action was permissible, the four Justices
applied the balancing test. Because the Justices thought that the
likelihood of ministers exerting sectarian influence in the legislature or constitutional convention was remote, they assigned the
asserted state interest of preventing the establishment of reli-

candidate for delegate to the convention. ..."
163. 435 U.S. at 621. The Tennessee court relied on the "belief-action dichotomy"
Which originated in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878), and was restated
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940):
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other
hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the
Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, thesecond cannot be.
Id. at 303-04. Some courts appear to have taken Justice Robert's statement to mean that
religiously based actions were not afforded any protection by the free exercise clause. As
a basis for deciding cases, the belief-action dichotomy has fallen into disuse. See Marcus,
The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973
DuKE L.J. 1217, 1233-38.
164. See supra note 163.
165. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627.
166. See supra note 163. The fact that other non-ministerial believers could hold
office supports this view.
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gion no weight and found the statute unconstitutional. 67
In an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan
rejected two propositions relied on by the Tennessee court: first,
that the statute reached only religious action rather than religious belief, and second, that because one could continue to
minister by forgoing the right to hold office, the statute did not
affect free exercise of religion. 68 The opinion disposed of the
second proposition by noting that similar arguments had been
rejected by the Court in previous decisions. 1 9 Justice Brennan,
attacked the first proposition because the actions the state
sought to regulate were equivalent to a particular level of religious belief.170 The fact that the strength of a man's religious

belief compelled him to enter the ministry should not be used to
divest him of the protection that the first amendment affords
those beliefs.171
Essentially, the disagreement on the Court in McDaniel
centered on the proper scope of the protection afforded by the
free exercise clause.172 Rather than applying the principle used

in Torcaso, the plurality opinion appears to have accepted the
Tennessee court's application of the belief-action dichotomy and
used the classification of McDaniel's ministry as action to justify
interest balancing. By using the balancing approach, the plurality declined to recognize a broader scope for the free exercise
clause, choosing instead to allow legislatures and the courts
greater freedom in supporting state interests that impinge upon
religious actions.1 73 In contrast, the Brennan opinion recognized

167. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629.
168. Id. at 630.
169. Id. at 633; See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961).
170. 435 U.S. at 631-32.
171. Id. at 634-35.
172.. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion
that Torcaso required the Court to declare the statute unconstitutional. 435 U.S. at 642.
Justice White reached a similar result in his concurring opinion, relying on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 435 U.S. at 643. Justice Blackmun did
not participate in the decision.
173. Compare McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627 n.7. "The absolute protection afforded belief by the First Amendment suggests that a court should be cautious in expanding the
scope of that protection since to do so might leave government powerless to vindicate
compelling state interests." (emphasis in original) with id. at 635 n.8 (Brennan, J.,
concurring):
The plurality's reliance on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), is mis-
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the unitary nature of some beliefs and actions and argued for
the consistent application of the Torcaso principle - "[b]ecause
the challenged provision establishes as a condition of office the
willingness to eschew certain protected religious practices ... it
violates the Free Exercise Clause.' 1 74 By applying a principled

approach Justice Brennan recognized that the scope of the free
exercise clause is broad enough to prevent all religiously based
classifications, regardless of whether they affect actions or
beliefs.

1 75

Torcaso and McDaniel presented slightly different problems
for the Court. The condition challenged in Torcaso was religiously based and directed at a type of religious belief. Those who
affirmed belief in God were allowed to hold political office while
those who did not affirm their belief in God were denied office.
The condition challenged in McDaniel also was religiously
based, but was directed at the degree of dedication or commitment one was thought to have to his particular belief. Those
whose commitment to religious belief was demonstrated by their
placed. The governmental action interfering with the free exercise of religion
here differs significantly from that in Yoder. There Amish parents challenged a
state statute requiring all children within the State to attend school until the
age of 16. The parents' claim was that this compulsion interfered with Amish
religious teachings requiring the deemphasis of intellectual training and avoidance of materialistic goals. In sustaining the parents' claim under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court found it necessary to balance the importance of the
secular values advanced by the statute, the closeness of the fit between those
ends and the means chosen, and the impact an exemption on religious grounds
would have on the State's goals, on the one hand, against the sincerity and
centrality of the objection to the State's goals to the sect's religious practice,
and the extent to which the governmental regulation interferred with that
practice, on the other hand. In Yoder, the statute implemented by religiously
neutral means an avowedly secular purpose which nevertheless burdened respondent's religious exercise. Cases of that nature require a sensitive and difficult accomodation of the competing interests involved.
By contrast, the determination of the validity of the statute involved here
requires no balancing of interests. Since "[b]y its terms, the Tennessee disqualification operates against McDaniel because of his status as a 'minister' or
'priest,'" ante, at 626-627 (emphasis in original), it runs afoul of the Free Exercise Clause simply as establishing a religious classification as a basis for qualification for a political office. Nevertheless, although my view-that because
the prohibition establishes a religious qualification for political office it is void
without more-does not require consideration of any compelling state interest, I
agree with the plurality that the State did not establish a compelling interest.
174. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also id. at 634 (indicating that both
Torcaso and Sherbert compel this result).
175. See supra note 173.
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entering the ministry were excluded from legislative office, regardless of what they believed.
The two cases are similar, however, because both dealt with
conditions having the purpose of classifying on the basis of religion. By requiring the appellants to forgo participation in government in order to maintain their beliefs or actions, the conditions had an indirect effect on appellants' free exercise of
religion. 71 8 The conditions in both cases were unconstitutional
because they imposed religiously based classifications that indirectly affected religion.
Although the conditions invalidated in Torcaso and McDaniel purposefully classified on the basis of religion and had an
indirect effect on religion, the Supreme Court has also invalidated conditions indirectly burdening religion where the classification involved was neutrally drawn. Sherbert v. Verner 177 involved a condition imposed on the receipt of government
benefits. In Sherbert, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a provision of the South Carolina Unemployment Security
Act 178 that disqualified from securing unemployment benefits
anyone who, without good cause, failed to accept available suitable work. The appellant, a Seventh Day Adventist, rejected employment that would have required her to work on Saturdays in
violation of her religious convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling which rejected the appellant's argument that the disqualification provision of the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to her because it denied
her free exercise of religion. The supreme court held that denying unemployment benefits did not infringe upon the appellant's
freedom of religion because she could forgo the benefits and still
refrain from working on Saturday.179
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that the first amendment absolutely protects religious beliefs, but noted that "certain overt acts" may constitutionally be subject to governmental regulation even when the
176. As Justice Brennan stated: "Sherbert and Torcaso compel the conclusion that
because the challenged provision requires appellant to purchase his right to engage in
the ministry by sacrificing his candidacy it impairs the free exercise of his religion."
McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J., concurring).
177. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
178. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-1 to -401 (1962).
179. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 303-04, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (1962).
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acts are motivated by religious belief.18 0 Acts within the scope of
government regulation include those which threaten public
safety, peace, or order. 181 The appellant's refraining from Saturday work was clearly not such an act. The Court also stated,
however, that an incidental burden placed upon appellant's religious activities "may be justified by a 'compelling state interest

in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate .
' "182
Having described the balancing test which it would apply,
the Court considered whether the disqualification provision burdened the appellant's religious activities.18" In determining that

180. Serbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
181. Id. (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)); Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
182. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
183. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. The Court has refined its indirect burden analysis in
contexts other than religion. Relying on its decisions in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court in Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), analyzed the indirect burden on the right to
travel arising from a durational residency requirement. The Arizona statute at issue required persons to reside in a county for one year before becoming eligible for nonemergency medical treatment available to indigents at county hospitals.
The Court stated that it would require a showing of a compelling state interest in
order to justify a state statute that deterred or penalized the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 256-59. Although the Court did not
purport to define "the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis," Id. at 259,
two things are clear from the Memorial Hospital opinion. First, actual deterrence of the
exercise of a constitutional right is not necessary to trigger compelling state interest
analysis. It appears that the Court applies an objective standard. If a reasonable person
would be deterred by the state regulation from exercising his rights the compelling state
interest analysis applies. See id. at 257-59. Second, denial of the exercise of a fundamental right is a penalty that triggers the compelling state interest analysis. See id. at 258.
The first of these conclusions has implications for the revocation of tax exemptions of
private religious schools with racially based policies.
It is reasonable to assume that revoking a school's tax exemption because of its racially based policies would put pressure on the school to forgo the policies. Whether the
school actually changes the policies is immaterial; the increased financial burden placed
on the school because of the policies would deter the school from maintaining them. This
conclusion is supported by the response of similarly situated schools to threats of lawsuits directed against their racially based policies. In Brown v. Dade Christian Schools,
556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), a parent, angered when a religious school refused to admit
her children because of their race, sued the school for damages and for an injunction
preventing enforcement of the racially based admission policy. The court of appeals
noted that immediately before the suit was commenced the church which operated the
schools considered changing the policy. Id. at 312. Similarly, the added expense of taxation will deter the free exercise of religion and trigger the compelling state interest
analysis.
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the provision burdened the appellant's exercise of religion, the
Court focused on the condition as an inducement for her to
abandon a religious practice in order to obtain unemployment
benefits. 84 Alternatively, if she did not give up her religious
practice, the condition would function as a penalty imposed
upon her free exercise of religion.185
The Court rejected the state's asserted interest of avoiding
fraudulent claims for unemployment compensation as one not
raised before the state supreme court and probably unsupported
by the record had it been raised. The Court apparently regarded
the subject of unemployment compensation as within the state's
regulatory power.
Sherbert struck down a condition which imposed an indirect burden on the appellant's free exercise of religion, and in
doing so provided the clearest statement of the Court's approach
to the entire class of condition cases.18 6 Justice Brennan recognized that while the absolute protection of the free exercise
clause cannot apply to all religiously motivated acts, the distinction between belief and action cannot serve as the basis for de-

The Supreme Court Court has not, however, always been quick to identify the presence of an indirect burden on the exercise of a constitutional right. In Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court denied that state
and federal government refusals to provide funding for abortions along with other medical expenses covered by the Medicaid program imposed a burden upon the right of a
woman to terminate her pregnancy. Maher at 473-74; Harris at 316-18. Although the
denial of Medicaid benefits to women seeking abortions is in some respects analogous to
the denial of tax exemption to private religious schools with racially based policies, there
are significant differences between the two types of cases. In both Maher and Harris the
Court indicated that women had a right to terminate their pregnancies, but that the
state had no corresponding duty to provide the money for them to do so.
In the case of religious schools' tax exemptions, payment is not an issue. Tax exemption is not funding, nor would any payment to religious schools be allowed under the
establishment clause. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as the
Court noted in Maher, a preferential legislative determination, like the one preferring
childbirth over abortion, would be prevented in the religious context by the establishment clause. Maher at 474-75 n.8. Hence, it appears that, despite some similarity to
Maher and Harris,the indirect burden analysis applicable in Bob Jones and Goldsboro
corresponds more closely to that followed in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital.
184. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
185. Id. at 405-06.
186. Arguably, cases involving a religiously based condition that imposes a direct
burden on religious belief are in a class by themselves. Like the condition in Torcaso, 367
U.S. 488 (1961), such conditions may be considered invalid "on their face" and would
involve no need to balance. However, because such conditions are so obviously unconstitutional, disputes over their constitutionality are not likely to reach the Supreme Court.
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ciding free exercise cases. Belief without action is unobservable
and could, therefore, never be the subject of regulation. Consequently, an interpretation of the free exercise clause that protects only beliefs is meaningless. Actions, as well as beliefs, merit
constitutional protection because they are the only way in which
one may manifest beliefs.
Nevertheless, absolute freedom of action claimed to be motivated by religious belief would inevitably lead to abuse. The
Court has therefore recognized two exceptions to the general
principle that the free exercise clause absolutely protects religious belief and actions motivated by religious belief. First, the
state may directly burden religiously motivated actions if those
actions substantially threaten public safety, peace, or order. Second, the state may indirectly burden religiously motivated actions, regardless of whether those actions affect public safety,
peace, or order, if the burden is necessary because of a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject which is within
the state's constitutional power to regulate. Thus, when the burden is direct, the state's interest must be in preventing the religiously motivated action or inaction. When the burden is indirect
it is sufficient that the state has a compelling interest in some
subject and that the burden on religiously motivated action is
necessary to further that interest.
3. Application
Although the analysis developed in the condition cases is
relatively easy to state, it is not so easy to apply. In analyzing
condition cases such as Bob Jones or Goldsboro, the first step is
to determine whether the burden placed on religion by the condition at issue is direct or indirect. An interpretation of or an
amendment to section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code elimi"7
18
nating tax exemption for schools with racially based policies
would place an indirect burden on the religious practices of Bob
Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools. Eliminating
the exemption would condition their receipt of a government
benefit upon their forgoing religiously motivated policies. Loss of
tax exemption would not, however, prevent the schools from
187. See H.R. 5313, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H9 (daily ed. Jan. 25,
1982).
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maintaining their policies.
Having determined that the burden upon religion is indirect, the next inquiry raises two questions. First, is the purpose
of the .regulation a compelling state interest within Congress'
constitutional power to regulate? Second, is the regulation necessary to achieve that purpose?
The Supreme Court often has concluded that eliminating
racial discrimination in education is a compelling state interest.188 The Court also has held that the thirteenth amendment 89
empowers Congress "to pass all laws necessary and proper for

abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States."'1 0 That power includes "the power . . . to determine
what are the badges and incidents of slavery."' 191 Congress'
power under the thirteenth amendment enables it to reach even
private discriminatory acts. 192 It appears, therefore, that Congress could, under the broadest reading of its thirteenth amendment powers, enact legislation prohibiting any private racially

discriminatory act. 193
Although eliminating racial discrimination is a compelling

state interest within Congress' power to regulate, elimination of
the tax exemptions for religious schools with racially based policies is not necessary to effectuate the state's interest. In order to
prove necessity, the state must "demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing

188. Eg., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
190. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
191. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
192. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976), the Court analyzed whether the first amendment right of association protected attendance at a discriminatory, private, secular
school in a manner similar to that used in first amendment speech cases. The Court
indicated that discrimination is a form of unprotected association in much the same way
that pornography is a form of unprotected speech. Id. at 176. While the analogy appears
apt, the Court failed to consider whether the same types of procedural safeguards applicable to state determinations that particular speech is unprotected, see, e.g., Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), should apply to determinations that a particular association is unprotected. See generally Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). If such procedural safeguards are required, any congressional action relating to private discriminatory
acts must place the burden of proving discrimination on the government. See supra note
95.
193. But see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 418 (White, J., dissenting); Sullivan, 396 U.S. at
241 (Harlan, J. dissenting); Jones, 392 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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First Amendment rights.

' 194

929

Elimination of tax exemption is

clearly not necessary because it would not further the asserted
state interest at all. Exemption, or the lack of it, would neither
alter the policies of the schools nor provide any advantage for
persons allegedly discriminated against. Because legislation
eliminating tax exemptions for religious schools with racially
based policies is not necessary to effect the asserted state interest in nondiscrimination, such legislation would violate the free
exercise clause.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court may dispose of the Bob Jones and
Goldsboro cases on the basis of the IRS lack of authority to engraft public policy limitations on the tax exemptions provided in
the Internal Revenue Code. Although a holding based on the
limited authority of the IRS would resolve both cases, it would
do little to resolve the underlying conflict between public policy
and religious freedom inherent in those cases.
Even if the IRS had authority to limit tax exemptions, the
public policy arguments advanced for denying the schools' exemptions sweep more broadly than the Constitution. The first
and fifth amendment prohibitions against government aid for religion and racial discrimination do not support the policy, because tax exemption is not impermissible government aid. The
thirteenth amendment prohibition against racial discrimination
in private contracts clearly does not support the policy as applied to Bob Jones University since the school's policy allows
students of all races equal freedom of contract. Arguably, the
thirteenth amendment does not support application ,of the policy to Goldsboro Christian Schools if the school's policy is based
upon a religious rather than a racial purpose of exclusiveness.
Because the policies advanced by the IRS sweep more
broadly than the Constitution, there is no clash of constitutional
issues. There is, however, a conflict between public policy and
constitutionally protected religious rights. A tax exemption
scheme that exempts only some nonprofit religious organizations
violates the neutrality principle of the establishment clause.
194. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425,
1432.
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Similarly, even a religiously neutral condition that imposes an
indirect burden on religious belief violates the free exercise
clause unless it is necessary to further a compelling state
interest.
This analysis suggests that revoking the tax exemptions of
the schools without also offending the religion clauses of the first
amendment is a difficult task, but not an impossible one. Congress could legislate to revoke the tax exemptions along with
those of all other nonprofit religious organizations. While it
would make the schools subject to taxation, such action would
do nothing to deter the racially based policies of the schools. Alternatively, under an extremely broad reading of the thirteenth
amendment, Congress could prohibit all private discrimination.
By defining discrimination in this manner, the act could prohibit
the schools' racially based policies. This action, if valid, would
stretch the thirteenth amendment to its limits for the purpose of
outlawing the religiously motivated practice of a few religious
groups. Accommodating the groups seems a small concession in
exchange for continued religious and individual freedom.
R. Scott Tewes
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